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The role of QSHC in furthering quality improvement and safety
‘‘Every system is perfectly designed
to achieve the results that it
achieves’’.
D
on Berwick has called this the
Central Law of Improvement.1
One might reasonably paraphrase
Berwick’s Central Law to apply to QSHC
as: ‘‘Every journal is perfectly designed to
achieve the results that it achieves’’. New
editorial leadership provides a timely opp-
ortunity to reflect on what results QSHC
might achieve going forward in advocacy
for more reliable and safe patient care.
Fiona Moss has provided highly effec-
tive, expert editorial leadership over the
last 13 years. During her tenure as Editor-
in-Chief, the journal has made significant
contributions to worldwide healthcare
improvement and patient safety. In parti-
cular, it has set high standards for rigo-
rous, sensible, and critical thinking in
these emerging scholarly fields. In that
spirit, her editorial in themost recent issue
of QSHC forcefully challenged us to work
evenmore effectively to integrate the roles
of the patient, the clinician, and the
organization for more reliable and safe
care.2 I want to echo her call for urgency.
Momentum is building. ‘‘To Err is
Human’’3 and ‘‘Crossing the Quality
Chasm’’,4 two frequently cited reports
issued by the Institute of Medicine of
the US National Academies of Sciences,
established compelling arguments for
change. I am increasingly optimistic
that we are near the tipping point where
the pace of change will build its own
momentum. QSHC will contribute to
that momentum.
I propose three questions to help
focus the journal’s strategy for that
contribution.
N How can QSHC foster ever more
rigorous scholarship in the fields of
healthcare improvement and patient
safety?
N How can QSHC speak effectively to a
broader readership—that is, a general
medical audience, other health pro-
fessionals, as well as the public?
N How can QSHC serve to heighten
awareness of the knowledge for
improvement and safety for the next
generation of health profession stu-
dents and trainees?
How can QSHC foster ever more
rigorous scholarship in the fields of
healthcare improvement and
patient safety?
Healthcare improvement and patient
safety are positioned as scholarly fields
in the academic community in much the
same way health services research was
2–3 decades ago—not orphans, but not
widely acknowledged as full members
of the academic family either. Early on,
many scholars, schooled in the labora-
tory, found it difficult to acknowledge as
scholarly health services research fields
such as clinical epidemiology and evi-
dence-based decision making. But that
misperception has given way in the
wake of careful application of statistical
methodology and rigorous definition of
new knowledge.
It is appropriate that quality improve-
ment and patient safety appear to be
undergoing a shorter trial as academic
fields. The societal imperative to make
health care better and safer is too great
to tolerate a meandering pace. More-
over, information technology provides
tools that support its development—
tools that were just emerging two
decades ago. It is incumbent upon this
journal to contribute to the definition of
the highest standards of scholarship. It
can do this even more effectively if forti-
fied by advice from authors who have a
stake in the discussion and an inno-
vative editorial board that has a respon-
sibility for the journal’s outcomes.
Such standards should be as explicit
and transparent as possible, both to
assure the development of valid new
knowledge and also to help define the
opportunities for those who envision their
scholarly careers in this rewarding and
important work. Every effort should be
made to guide young scholars toward this
end. While the research focus of medical
schools and teaching hospitals—the dis-
covery of new knowledge—makes these
settings appropriate test beds for new
ideas for improvement and safety, aca-
demic doctors cannot hope to build their
scholarly careers until their important
contributions are properly acknowledged
by their peers. It is fitting that the editorial
board should re-examine regularly the
criteria that constitute rigor and new
knowledge in the field.
How can QSHC speak effectively to
a broader readership—a general
medical audience, other health
professionals, as well as the
public?
New knowledge for quality improve-
ment and safety is too vital to the
welfare of patients to be focused on a
specialized medical readership. This
places new obligations on scholarly
journals to make such knowledge com-
pelling and accessible. This journal can
serve the medical profession—and the
patients that the profession serves—by
the active pursuit of a diverse readership
which includes not only the broad
specialties of medicine, but also nursing,
pharmacy, health systems management,
and information technology experts.
Patients also should be brought into
this discussion as active participants.
The authors of ‘‘Crossing the Quality
Chasm’’ put heavy emphasis on the role
of patient centred care as a path to
closing the gaps in quality. It is note-
worthy that scholars have begun to
validate the patient’s unique role in
improving care. Examples include
shared decision making as a tool to
reduce variation,5 the patient’s central
role in high performance clinical micro-
systems,6 and the role of the informed
activated patient in the improved out-
comes produced in the chronic care
model.7 In this regard, QSHC could do
well to make its content as accessible as
possible to patients and their families.
How can QSHC serve to heighten
awareness of the knowledge for
improvement and safety for the
next generation of health
profession students and trainees?
Medical students and residents—as
upcoming stewards of the healthcare
system—must learn clinical medicine in
medical settings that reflect the best
patient care achievable if they are to
fulfil their future roles in directing
needed improvement in the healthcare
system and delivery of high quality, safe
health care. Systems improvement and
patient safety must be integrated into
medical education at all levels.8 9 But
formal courses in these fields will have
little value if students and trainees do
not find these elements implemented
when they arrive at the clinical setting.
QSHC must provide a forum by serving
as the source for the scholarly innova-
tive work of medical educators who
focus their work on educating for
healthcare improvement.
We at the BMJ Publishing Group plan
to use the coming months to review
these questions—and others that will
inevitably emerge. We will be mindful
that an important tenet of improvement
is transparency. We will seek advice
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everywhere we can find it—including
advice from clinicians, healthcare man-
agers, and scholars in healthcare impro-
vement and safety as well as health
profession students and patients around
the world. We will also seek consultation
from colleagues in journalism and other
medical journals. A principal source of
advice will be the current QSHC reader-
ship. In this regard, a survey for readers is
available at the QSHC homepage (http://
www.qshc.com). I invite all readers to
take advantage of this opportunity to
offer advice, either via the website or
personally to me by email.
Qual Saf Health Care 2005;14:2–3.
doi: 10.1136/qshc.2004.013417
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It is time to pause and reflect on the degree to which performance
measurement is acting optimally and in the interests of society and
health
T
he last 10 years have seen an
explosion of activity in the measure-
ment of health care performance
with the expenditure of huge resources
on many different systems of data
collection, analysis and reporting and
the development of thousands of indi-
cators. Large exercises have been under-
taken by various quality organisations
to develop, apply, and report the results
of performance indicators. Examples
include the National Quality Forum,
the Joint Commission on Accredita-
tion of Healthcare Organisations, the
National Committee for Quality Assur-
ance and, in the UK, the Healthcare
Commission and Dr Foster. This has
become a multi-million pound industry
fuelled partly by increasing anxiety by
society (especially its political represen-
tatives) about the variation in quality
and safety of care—an anxiety heigh-
tened as the results of more measure-
ments reveal even more problems.
Whenever such an industry develops
rapidly, it is useful to pause and reflect
on the degree to which it is acting
optimally and in the interests of society
and health.
WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS?
As with many new technologies in
which people invest, hoping it will solve
problems simply, the experience has
been disappointing. A catalogue of
problems has been reported related to
everything from poor data quality and
comparability, cost and collection bur-
den, different priorities or perspectives
among stakeholders, insufficient exper-
tise and, most importantly, insufficient
linkage with subsequent action. These
are problems encountered in industry,
but performance assessment and man-
agement is even more difficult in health
care where there is greater dimen-
sionality in organisational (including
societal) goals. Health care is less
deterministic and the link between
actions and outcomes is much less direct
than in most production processes,
being modified or confounded by other
activities, patient case mix, and other
non-health care factors. The relation-
ship with the customer is more complex
than in many other services, and there is
a wider range of stakeholders with non-
compatible aims.
The performance measurement
industry (public and private) takes as
its starting point that ‘‘quality measure-
ment and reporting is a powerful
mechanism to drive quality improve-
ment’’.1 However, there is still little
evidence of a positive impact on decision
making, improvement in health service
delivery, or health outcomes.2 We do not
know the degree to which measurement
and reporting by itself or linked to other
processes results in improvements in
quality and safety, not only as measured
by the indicators used but also those
aspects of care not necessarily measured
by the indicators—that is, the overall
effect. Groups busy developing ‘‘evidence-
based indicators’’ do not appear to apply
the same criteria to their own activity as
they do to clinical practice. Given the
immense resources going into this, it is
astounding that there has not been more
pressure to demonstrate impact and value
for money. Just as new health technolo-
gies have to be rigorously evaluated for
effectiveness and increasingly for cost
effectiveness, so should performance
measurement systems.3
LITTLE RIGOROUS EVALUATION
Research on performance assessment
systems that has been carried out is
often of poor quality and naı¨ve. Evalua-
tions are usually tautological in the
sense that the yardsticks used to evalu-
ate the impact of performance assess-
ment are the same potentially imperfect
instruments used in the assessment
itself. This reflects a more general pro-
blem of poor research into quality
improvement.4 Experimental app-
roaches have generally been eschewed
in the quality improvement field. How-
ever, single group pre-test/post-test
designs have low internal validity due
to the absence of the counterfactual
(what would have happened without
the intervention).5 The results from
different designs can give widely diver-
gent results—the more rigorous the
evaluations of continuous quality
improvement, for example, the smaller
the estimated impact.6 The point here is
that evaluations should be aimed at
convincing those who are sceptical or
who will be asked to make serious
investments or change their practices
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as a result, and not those who are already
supporters. In addition, alongside more
experimental approaches, researchers
need to consider both the ‘‘whether’’
and the ‘‘why’’ questions in the same
evaluations and this presents some inter-
esting methodological challenges.
The performance indicator industry
needs to move away from feeding the
performance measurement ‘‘sausage
machine’’ producing more and more
sophisticated indicators. Instead, we
need to consider more the effects of this
activity on the quality and safety of
organisations7 and also on the possible
unintended effects.3 Indicators are
not direct measures of performance,
although they can be used to draw
attention to issues that may need
further investigation or flags to alert us
to possible opportunities for improve-
ment. In many cases considerable
analysis, interpretation, and further
investigation (drilling down) are
required in order to understand properly
what is happening, why, and what can
be done to improve or sustain perfor-
mance. The interpretation of variations
in indicators may often be wrong,
leading to inferences which are both
misleading and unfair.8
TRUST VERSUS OVERSIGHT
What effect does the collection, publica-
tion, and use of performance data have
on levels of trust and on other social and
organisational features of healthcare
delivery, the professions, patients and
the public? No system of external
measurement and auditing will be able
to substitute for the relations of trust
and professionalism which can also
promote quality.9 The indicator industry
has begun to suffer from the ‘‘regula-
tors’ delusion’’ that central systems of
oversight are the sole guarantors of
quality and a bulwark against poor
practice and performance. The contrary
is true; most healthcare professionals
have a common and natural concern
with the benefit of their activities for
patients. It is not the case that they only
respond to formal evidence of perfor-
mance and little else although, of
course, these formal systems can make
a significant difference if mainly at the
margin.
The creative combination of oversight
and active professional self-regulation is
probably the best way forward. The
promotion of professionally led clinical
audit based on high quality clinical
databases is one promising approach
which can harness the enthusiasm of
clinicians. As trust gets eroded in gen-
eral and accelerated by the culture of
measurement, comparison and expo-
sure, one of the key policy and research
questions for the industry is whether we
can develop more trust promoting
approaches rather than trust eroding
ones.
Qual Saf Health Care 2005;14:3–4.
doi: 10.1136/qshc.2004.013185
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It’s about more than money: financial
incentives and internal motivation
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The contribution of financial incentives to quality improvement will
only be maximised if we understand their impact on the internal
drivers of health professionals
H
igh profile initiatives such as the
incentive programme introduced
by the Centre for Medicare and
Medicaid Services in the US1 and the
new general practitioner contract in the
UK2 highlight the enthusiasm of policy
makers for using financial incentives as
a way of improving the quality of care.
This enthusiasm is understandable,
given the burden of healthcare costs
experienced by most countries. It makes
sense to ensure that resources are
targeted on buying desirable behaviours
from health professionals and produ-
cing beneficial outcomes for patients.
But is the fascination with financial
incentives based on sound empirical
evidence? At a general level the answer
is a guarded ‘‘yes’’. We know from
observational studies that the way in
which doctors are paid is associated
with particular patterns of clinical beha-
viour. For example, doctors paid under
fee-for-service schemes undertake more
visits and conduct more investigations
than those paid under capitation
schemes.3 In contrast, it is less easy to
find a convincing causal link between
targeted incentives and the behaviour of
individual doctors, and little attention
seems to have been paid to what might
be termed ‘‘spillover’’ effects—that is,
the impact of incentives on behaviours
other than those incentivised. In part,
this lack of evidence results from the
methodological challenges associated
with linking interventions to complex
behavioural change. Even taking this
into account, the evidence still leaves us
with the impression that incentives do
not induce the rational and predictable
response that some observers would
have us believe.
There are several examples to illus-
trate the problem. Firstly, the size of an
incentive does not have a linear rela-
tionship with its impact. Indeed, there is
some evidence that doctors may have a
target income—perhaps a fixed sense of
financial worth—above which they are
no longer motivated to respond.4
Secondly, it also appears that the eco-
nomic component of what appears to be
a financially based incentive scheme is
not what motivates professionals. In a
local improvement project in the UK,
much vaunted as a ‘‘successful’’ exam-
ple of incentivising quality improve-
ments, the costs to some of the
participating general practices of imple-
menting more effective systems of
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chronic disease management were
greater than the resulting financial
rewards.5 This did not seem to dampen
the enthusiasm of those involved.
Similarly, in a study conducted in
Ireland, incentives to change prescribing
behaviour were just as effective in
dispensing practices (where there is a
countervailing incentive to dispense
expensive drugs) as in non-dispensing
practices.6 These examples indicate that
something more than personal financial
gain is driving professional behaviour.
In attempting to explain this anom-
alous evidence, attention has focused on
confounding variables such as the age
and sex of physicians, their previous
experience of incentives and payment
methods, the type and severity of the
condition being incentivised, the
volume of activity, and the location
and type of practice.7 All of these factors
seem to be important, but together they
fail to account for the unpredictable and
variable impact that has been observed.
A more convincing explanation perhaps
lies in the relationship between external
incentives such as material rewards and
the internal ‘‘moral’’ motivation of
health professionals.
Frank defines moral motivation as a
force which encourages people to
behave in ways which have no obvious
advantages to the individual and may
even prove contrary to their interests.8
Every day we see examples of this kind
of behaviour—customers who leave tips
in restaurants to which they will never
return, people who make anonymous
charitable donations, and health profes-
sionals who ‘‘go the extra mile’’ with
their patients with no thought of finan-
cial reward. One study even showed that
insurance salesmen—a group not popu-
larly recognised for their moral drivers—
have been shown to be guided by a
strong, almost religious, moral code.9
If policy makers and managers have
convinced themselves that they can buy
‘‘desirable’’ behaviours, why should they
be concernedwith the internalmotivation
of their workforce? The answer lies in the
potential of externally imposed incentives
to impact on internal motivation, even
where such activities are recognised as the
right thing to do. Evidence of the effects
of disregarding moral motivation can be
found in the literatures of economics,
social psychology, and organisational
sociology.
From an economic perspective, Frey
describes this as ‘‘crowding out’’.10 The
psychological processes underlying the
phenomenon have been explained in
two ways. Firstly, external incentives
may impair self-determination, result-
ing in a shift in the locus of control and
the resulting loss of professional auton-
omy. Secondly, external drivers may
damage self-esteem, resulting in the
perception that professionalism is no
longer valued. Crowding out appears to
be more marked when external incen-
tives are linked to perceived regulatory
activity and managed in a bureaucratic
fashion by people unknown to the
recipients of the incentives. In contrast,
if people feel that they ‘‘own’’ the
incentives, then they can have the effect
of enhancing internal motivation (the
‘‘crowding in’’ effect). It appears that
more mechanical tasks are less likely to
be crowded out than creative ones. This
might explain the support for incentives
from those who are inclined to focus on
the technical aspects of delivering care,
and the antipathy of others who focus
on the ‘‘art’’ of clinical practice.
From a social psychological perspec-
tive there is ample evidence, including a
meta-analysis of 128 experimental stu-
dies,11 that ‘‘crowding out’’ is a real
phenomenon. The literature of organisa-
tional sociology has recognised for more
than half a century that incentivisation
of rule governed behaviour is likely to
lead to ‘‘goal displacement’’ in which
rule following becomes a means to an
end other than that intended by the
designers of the system.12 This observation
has been drawn upon in more recent
sociological writing about the displace-
ment of trust and moral motivation
brought about by the current emphasis
on ‘‘managing’’ the performance of health
and social care professionals.13
Financial incentives will no doubt
continue to play an important role in the
armoury of tools available to improve the
quality of health care. Their contribution
will, however, only be maximised if we
understand the impact of financial incen-
tives on the internal drivers of health
professionals. In this respect there are
some quick wins for those designing
incentive schemes. It seems likely that
financial incentives will be more effective
if they are owned by their target audience
and aligned to the professional values of
this audience. It is also likely that overly
bureaucratic schemes are more likely to
damage professional motivation and that
the incentives should be targeted more on
the technical aspects and less on the
indeterminate aspects of professional
practice. It would therefore be inappropri-
ate to attempt to link financial rewards to
complex diagnostic processes or to the
psychosocial aspects of care provision.
Beyond this, there is much that we do
not know about how best to use
incentives to change the behaviour of
health professionals. In particular, it is
essential that we develop a deeper
understanding of the relationship
between incentivised and non-incenti-
vised professional work. The new UK GP
contract provides a case in point. On the
one hand, the incentivisation (agreed
with the profession itself) of indicators
about the routine treatment of single
chronic conditions does make sense in
the context of the evidence. On the
other hand, it seems possible that, as an
increasing proportion of total GP work is
incentivised, the risks of crowding out
of motivation to perform the non-
incentivised more complex or simply
caring tasks is increased. This is an area
of policy that really does need to be
underpinned by high quality evidence.
Qual Saf Health Care 2005;14:4–5.
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